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A B S T R A C T
Dramatic growth in herbicide-resistant (HR) weeds in the United States threatens farm profitability and may
undercut environmentally beneficial farming practices. When HR weeds move across farm boundaries due to
ecological processes or human action, a common pool resource challenge emerges, requiring farmer cooperation
to manage such weeds effectively. We investigate the scope for cooperative management using responses to a
national survey on HR weed issues to test a recursive model of three preconditions for collective action: (1)
concern about HR weeds migrating from nearby lands; (2) communication with neighbors about HR weeds; and
(3) belief that cooperation is necessary for effective resistance management. Results suggest that farmers who
relied more on Extension educators regarding weed management, were more likely to satisfy each precondition.
Further, concern about weeds resistant to multiple herbicides as well as concern about HR weed mobility po-
sitively influence concern about migration and views toward cooperation. Farmer time constraints and “techno-
optimism” (a belief that herbicide discoveries will solve resistance problems) detract from the perceived need for
cooperative approaches. A different set of factors significantly affect each precondition, suggesting heterogeneity
in the underlying casual mechanisms. The findings can help tailor collective action to different socio-ecological
settings experiencing HR weed resistance issues.
1. Introduction
Sensitivity to herbicides among a weed population is an under-ap-
preciated ecosystem service. Herbicides kill weeds by disrupting the
balance of biochemical and physiological processes of plants, governed
by the given gene pool. By conserving the susceptibility of weeds to
herbicides through various management tactics, the effectiveness of
such herbicide applications can be sustained. However, if the same
herbicide is used repeatedly, selection pressure favors the survival of
weeds resistant to said herbicide and other herbicides with similar
mechanisms of action. Through evolution, this leads to a population of
herbicide-resistant (HR) weeds. Early research noted that susceptibility
of insects to insecticides was an exhaustible resource that could be
depleted through repetitive use of specific insecticides (Hueth and
Regev, 1974; Miranowski and Carlson, 1986). Such resource depletion
now appears to be occurring with herbicides. A rise in HR weeds
threatens the sustainability of genetically engineered HR crop systems,
jeopardizes food security, and poses human health and environmental
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risks (NRC, 2010; 2016; Swinton and Van Deyenze, 2017).
Adding another layer to this problem is the mobility of certain HR
weeds, which travel across farms and over landscapes. Early research
on managing pest resistance concluded that mobility was a problem
with insect pests, but not weeds (Clark and Carlson, 1990; Carlson and
Wetzstein, 1993; Gould, 1995; Pannell and Zilberman, 2001; Llewellyn
et al., 2001). Recent evidence, however, indicates HR weed mobility is
more significant than previously thought, although the risk pattern
varies by species (Beckie et al., 2015; Ervin and Frisvold, 2016; Shaner
and Beckie, 2014). Mobility of weeds occurs through the following
avenues: pollen movement; water conveyance of weed seeds; migratory
bird flights; interstate livestock feed; and other processes, e.g., ma-
chinery transport (Diggle and Neve, 2001; Norsworthy et al., 2009;
Dauer et al., 2006; Sosnoskie et al., 2012). If seed mobility is pervasive,
maintaining herbicide efficacy becomes a common pool resource (CPR)
challenge, thwarting decentralized market-based management, as ne-
gative externalities between farmers transpire. The unique character-
istics of CPR systems make it costly to exclude individuals from bene-
fiting from their use (Ostrom, 1990). Weed scientists have called for
collective, regional responses among farmers, acknowledging common
pool problems (Beckie et al., 2015; Shaner and Beckie, 2014).
Traditionally, the predominant approach to manage HR weeds has
been through education and technical assistance (E&TA) programs,
administered by both public and private entities, to influence individual
farmer decisions (Shaw, 2016). In particular, E&TA programs attempt
to influence farmers into voluntarily adopting best management prac-
tices (BMPs) (Norsworthy et al., 2012). Despite broad scientific con-
sensus regarding BMPs and the considerable resources devoted to
programs promoting their use, HR weeds continue to spread (Owen,
2016; Heap, 2018).
Two preliminary conclusions may be drawn regarding E&TA efforts.
First, the adoption of a number of critical BMPs recommended in E&TA
programs remains limited (Frisvold et al., 2009; Prince et al., 2012; Riar
et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2016). Second, the number and spatial spread
of resistant weeds species across North America has continued to in-
crease (Heap, 2018). Proposals for improving the efficacy of E&TA
programs have been advanced but are embryonic and their efficacy
remain open to question (Asmus and Schroeder, 2016; Schroeder et al.,
2018). One possible reason for the lack of success of E&TA programs is
that benefits to farmers remain dependent on their neighbors' will-
ingness to also engage in BMPs. Moreover, farmers tend to be less
willing to adopt BMPs when presented with uncertain payoffs (Doohan
et al., 2010).
This paper assesses the CPR conundrum and farmers' potential re-
ceptivity to cooperative approaches to resistance management. There
has been limited empirical work on grower decisions to collectively
control insect pests or weeds (Rook and Carlson, 1985; Graham and
Rogers, 2017; Stallman and James Jr, 2015). Using responses from a
national HR weed management survey, we provide evidence at a
broader scale. Our study focuses on three preconditions for im-
plementing CPR management: (1) farmers' concern about HR weeds
migrating from nearby farming operations; (2) farmers' communication
with their neighbors about HR weeds; and (3) farmers' views that HR
weeds cannot be managed effectively without cooperation among
farmers in a community. We use insights from literature in CPR, ex-
haustible resource management, and pest management to build a model
linking the preconditions with key farmer and farm characteristics.
Binary response probit regression estimations identify the effects of
such characteristics on each precondition. The findings have implica-
tions for instituting cooperative approaches to HR weed management.
2. Background Literature
2.1. When Are Cooperative Approaches to HR Weed Management Feasible?
A substantial body of literature has investigated approaches to
effectively manage CPRs. In his seminal article, Garrett Hardin (1968)
focuses primarily on the need for governmental regulation. However,
Ostrom and collaborators assemble evidence from around the globe
indicating voluntary, community-based approaches can be effective
(Ostrom, 1990, 2009; Ostrom et al., 2012). Their work documents the
requirements for privately-led, voluntary schemes to not only materi-
alize, but also persist. Three preconditions implicit to launching such
collective action are: (1) awareness of the effects that others' actions
have on one's own welfare; (2) communication between resource users;
and (3) recognition of the need for cooperation to prevent resource
exhaustion (Ostrom et al., 2012).
To effectively manage the weed gene pool, the heterogeneous
community of farmers must address their differences to achieve an
optimal solution path. This process includes a series of adaptive man-
agement steps – facilitation, negotiation, and bargaining – requiring
time and resources from farmers (Ervin and Jussaume, 2014). The
transaction costs of iterating toward effective management regimes
may be substantial, but lower for those with strong community in-
volvement and, in particular, good working relationships with Exten-
sion educators. Such costs become more tolerable to the degree that
farmers perceive increased vulnerability and economic liability from
their neighbors' weed control actions. A principal objective of our
empirical analysis is to identify which farmers are more (and less) likely
to view cooperation favorably.
Conceptual analyses of CPR management schemes to control HR
weeds highlight several requirements: (1) strong scientific basis; (2)
effective communication of scientific principles; (3) active involvement
of social scientists to understand farmer behavior; (4) strong leadership;
(5) ongoing monitoring, reporting, and evaluation; and (6) clear geo-
graphic boundaries (Ervin and Frisvold, 2016; Miranowski, 2016).
These conceptual analyses implicitly assume the three preconditions
described above are satisfied. Our study takes a step back, examining
the accuracy of this assumption.
2.2. What Factors Influence farmers' Perceptions of HR Weed Mobility,
Communication with Neighbors, and Their Receptivity to Cooperative
Behavior?
To date, few studies have analyzed neighbor interactions to achieve
collective action of HR weeds. As an exception, Stallman and James
(2015) analyze the willingness of Missouri farmers to cooperatively
manage pests. They surveyed growers about their willingness to work
with neighbors to control pests, to cooperatively scout for pests, and to
participate in county-wide crop rotation programs. Interest by Missouri
farmers in cooperative action is high, as 91% of respondents said they
would be willing to participate in such efforts. Moreover, the authors
contend that simple, local cooperative efforts may be more popular
than formal, county-wide efforts. In particular, a farmer's willingness to
cooperate is positively associated with five factors: (1) they expect to
receive a net benefit from pest control cooperation; (2) they have farms
similar to their neighbors; (3) they are an active member of a com-
munity organization; (4) they have positive contact with Extension
educators; and (5) they are concerned about the effect pesticides have
on the environment.
Farmers' willingness to cooperate in community-based pest control,
as seen in Stallman and James (2015), is a close variant of our third
precondition. Their findings inform our choice of variables for em-
pirical analysis. Our conceptual framework, explained below, also in-
cludes farmers' perceptions concerning weed mobility, personal mobi-
lity (ability to successfully farm elsewhere), and “techno-optimism”
defined as the expectation that a new herbicide will be discovered by
the time a weed develops resistance to a specific herbicide (Bain et al.,
2017; Dentzman, 2018; Dentzman et al., 2016). Lastly, by using farmer
responses from a national survey, which includes five major crop pro-
duction regions, we assess whether the findings from Stallman and
James (2015) extend beyond Missouri.
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Graham and Rogers (2017) conducted a qualitative analysis of three
local landholder groups in Australia which collectively managed weeds.
Their findings suggest collective weed control is primarily about sup-
porting the individual (farmer), proactively engaging landholders with
the worst weed infestations, and focusing the group's efforts on the
common challenge weeds pose. In addition, they argue that the more
successful groups organized community events designed to build social
relationships among members. Similarly, Stallman and James (2015)
find a positive relationship between a farmer's level of social capital and
willingness to work with neighbors on pest control. Although scale was
not analyzed explicitly, the success of the small landholder groups
implies that local, cooperative efforts are likely to be more successful
than larger scale efforts. The landholder groups thought the govern-
ment could assist their efforts by providing funds, engaging landholders
who were unwilling to cooperate directly with the group, and con-
trolling weeds on public lands. Ostrom et al. (2012) includes this sup-
portive, but not necessarily regulatory, role of government in privately-
led CPR management. This line of argument highlights the importance
of determining the appropriate scale for HR weed management
(Cumming et al., 2006):
“Scale mismatches occur when the scale of environmental variation
and the scale of social organization in which the responsibility for
management resides are aligned in such a way that one or more
functions of the social-ecological system are disrupted, inefficiencies
occur, and/or important components of the system are lost
(Cumming et al., 2006, p.2).”
3. Conceptual Model Development
Our study analyzes factors influencing the preconditions for col-
lective action, that is, a farmer's concern about HR weeds migrating
from nearby farming operations, discussing HR weeds with neighboring
farmers, and belief that cooperation among farmers is needed to ef-
fectively manage HR weeds. Responses to the following survey ques-
tions were used to construct dependent variables that reflect a re-
spondent's agreement with each precondition.
A. I am concerned about herbicide-resistant weeds spreading to my
farming operation from nearby farming operations.
B. Have you ever discussed with the owner/manager of a field abutting
or near one of yours whether herbicide-resistant weeds are be-
coming a problem in your region?
C. Weed resistance can be managed effectively without cooperation
among farmers in a community.
Binary variables are constructed for each question, permitting the
use of a probit model. Such variable construction is described in more
detail later in the analysis.
3.1. Literature Identifying Potential Explanatory Factors
Previous studies help identify the factors that can affect collective weed
management. Hurley and Frisvold (2016), surveying several studies, found
multiple factors affecting weed management in general and herbicide re-
sistance management (HRM) in particular. These included simplicity, con-
venience, flexibility, consistent crop protection, yield loss, and land stew-
ardship. Hurley and Mitchell (2014) conducted a detailed factor analysis
that identifies time management as well as human and environmental
health concerns as key motivators of herbicide (and insecticide) manage-
ment decisions. In an applicable study of cooperative insect pest manage-
ment, Ayer (1997) highlighted the roles of expected profit, communication
and information, and group size, heterogeneity, and transaction costs. These
findings suggest a wide range of factors can influence herbicide resistance
management. Therefore, potential explanatory variables include both pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary factors.
Factors that foster or hinder collective action efforts on resource
management have received extensive study (e.g., Kahan, 2003; Ostrom,
1990; Ostrom, 2009). For example, collective action theory suggests
individuals will be willing to cooperate with others in solving a problem
to the degree they derive positive net benefits in doing so. People are
less likely to cooperate if they perceive high costs of participating with
an unfamiliar group, especially when large transaction costs prevail. If
farmers have a strong set of social relationships with their neighbors,
reflecting high social capital, they will more likely be able to detect HR
weed movements and entertain possible cooperative approaches
(Pretty, 2003).
3.2. Hypotheses
Using insights from the literature, we propose the following hy-
potheses:
Hypothesis 1. Extension influence – We posit the influence of
Extension educators in providing information to farmers regarding
HRM has a positive effect on each dependent variable. Extension
education can augment both the human and social capital of farmers
to the degree farmers access the information (Prokopy et al., 2008).
Therefore, farmers who assess more importance to Extension education
are expected to be more aware of and concerned about HR weed
migration, more inclined to communicate with their neighbors about
HR weeds, and more likely to view cooperative approaches as necessary
for effective management.
Hypothesis 2. Inadequate time – Diversifying weed management
practices to control resistance involves added management and labor
time, which pose a significant opportunity cost for the operator
(Gunsolus and Buhler, 1999; Owen, 2016). Hurley and Mitchell
(2014) and Hurley and Frisvold (2016) discuss time concerns as a
significant factor in HRM. Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2005), Riar et al.
(2013), and Smith (2002) have documented time requirements as a
significant constraint in weed management.
Hypothesis 3.Multiple resistant (MR) weed concern – A farmer's degree
of concern about the presence of weeds resistant to multiple herbicides is
taken as an indicator of the perceived benefits of managing HR weeds.
Recent studies demonstrate that, if a farmer and neighbor both manage
glyphosate resistance to horseweed in soybean production, long-run farm
net returns will increase over uncoordinated actions (Livingston et al.,
2016). Stallman and James Jr (2015) found that Missouri farmers' perceived
benefit of cooperation on pest control significantly increases their
willingness to participate in such efforts.
Hypothesis 4.Weed mobility – Growing evidence documents HR weed
movement between neighboring farms of sometimes great distances
(Ervin and Frisvold, 2016). The recognition of this negative externality
can prompt farmers to consider ways to avert damages to their
operations. Therefore, we expect this variable, measuring the
operator's concern about HR weed mobility, will have a positive
effect on each dependent variable. One might surmise this variable to
be highly related to the dependent variable that measures the level of
concern about HR weed migration from nearby lands. However, our
empirical results suggest the two variables capture distinct effects.
Hypothesis 5. Techno-optimism – The extent to which farmers expect
the development and commercialization of a new herbicide chemistry
that will effectively and economically control HR weeds affects their
willingness to manage resistance (Dentzman et al., 2016). A higher
level of techno-optimism translates to less concern about the migration
of such weeds and less willingness to participate in cooperative HR
weed management. Dentzman (2018) finds the level of techno-
optimism is lower for farmers who report HR weeds on their
operations. This may explain why farmers are more likely to use
integrated weed management practices if they have serious HR weed
D.E. Ervin et al. Ecological Economics 157 (2019) 237–245
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infestation problems on their own farm (Bonny, 2016; Livingston et al.,
2016).
Hypothesis 6. Other grower influence – We query respondents about
the importance of social networks for obtaining information about
weed management approaches. Consistent with the findings of
Dentzman and Jussaume (2017), we expect farmers who assign
higher importance to the information they obtain from other farmers
to be more aware of HR weed migration, communicate more with
neighbors about HR weed issues, and better understand the advantages
of cooperative approaches.
Hypothesis 7. Community ties – The degree to which a farmer interacts
with their community likely reflects the level of social connectedness in
the area. Assuming higher levels translate to lower organizational costs,
it should positively affect a farmer's receptivity to cooperative
approaches. In addition, it is possible that higher levels of
connectedness promote the sharing of HR weed information. We
expect that a respondent's degree of community involvement to have
a positive effect on farmers' willingness to cooperate with neighbors in
HR weed management, similar to Stallman and James (2015).
Hypothesis 8. Personal mobility – Respondents were asked whether
they “could farm in any location successfully without having to learn
new skills.” We hypothesize that each precondition is negatively
affected if a farmer considered it to be relatively easy to move to
another location. The ability to move away from weed problems may
substitute for addressing them on a current operation.
In addition, we control for farmer and farm operation characteristics
that have been used in other studies of pest control adoption (e.g.,
Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2005; Frisvold et al., 2009; Dong et al., 2016).
Such characteristics may be correlated with some of our hypothesized
variables and dependent variables of interest and serve to reduce po-
tential omitted variable bias. For example, consider operator age. We
expect older farmers have shorter planning horizons and/or higher
discount rates, leading to reduced willingness for HR weed manage-
ment. Other characteristics, such as risk tolerance, are also included
(Dohmen et al., 2011). Farm size and percent of land owned are in-
cluded to estimate possible farm structure influences. We also include
average state farm size to detect possible influence from surrounding
farm configurations. On a regional scale, larger average farm size may
dampen the externality, as there are fewer interactions between
farmers, ultimately, reducing the interaction costs of communication.
Depending upon the geometric pattern, farm boundaries typically in-
crease with farm size. In this case, larger average farm size may increase
a farmer's concern about HR weed migration, and in turn, their
Table 1
Variable descriptions and summary statistics for regression sample (N=565).
Variables Survey question/description Mean S.D.
Dependent
Concern about HR weeds spreading from
nearby operations
I am concerned about herbicide-resistant weeds spreading to my farming operation from nearby farming
operations: Binary variable= 1 for somewhat agree or strongly agree,=0 for strongly disagree, somewhat
disagree, or neither agree nor disagree.
0.71 0.45
Discuss HR weed problems with neighbors Have you ever discussed with the owner/manager of a field abutting or near one of yours whether herbicide-
resistant weeds are becoming a problem in your region? Binary variable=1 for yes, =0 for no.
0.56 0.50
Disagree that HR weeds can be managed w/o
cooperation
Weed resistance can be managed effectively without cooperation among farmers in a community. Binary




Extension influence Importance of extension educators for developing weed management approaches. 5-point Likert scale: 1= not
at all/not applicable, 2= somewhat unimportant, 3=neither important nor unimportant, 4= somewhat
important, 5= very important.
3.61 1.12
Inadequate time I do not have adequate time for managing weeds on my farm. 5-point Likert scale: 1= strongly disagree,
2= somewhat disagree; 3= neither agree not disagree, 4= somewhat agree, 5= strongly agree.
1.97 1.14
Multiple resistant weed concern How concerned are you about the presence of weeds resistant to multiple herbicides on your farming
operation? 4-point Likert scale: 1= not concerned at all, 2= not very concerned, 3= somewhat concerned,
4= very concerned.
3.46 0.74
Weed mobility perceived Even if I keep my fields clean, I could get herbicide-resistant weeds from neighboring farms. 5-point Likert
scale: 1= strongly disagree, 2= somewhat disagree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= somewhat agree,
5= strongly agree.
4.20 0.84
Techno-optimism By the time a weed develops resistance to an herbicide, at least one new herbicide will have been found to
replace it. 5-point Likert scale: 1= strongly disagree, 2= somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree,
4= somewhat agree, 5= strongly agree.
2.39 1.02
Other grower influence Importance of other growers for developing weed management approaches. 5-point Likert scale: 1= not at all/
not applicable, 2= somewhat important, 3= neither important nor unimportant, 4= somewhat important,
5= very important.
3.90 0.97
Community ties I have strong ties to other farmers in my community. 5-point Likert scale: 1= strongly disagree, 2= somewhat
disagree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= somewhat agree, 5= strongly agree.
4.08 0.89
Personal mobility I could farm in any location successfully without having to learn new skills. 5-point Likert scale: 1= strongly
disagree, 2= somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4= somewhat agree, 5= strongly agree.
2.51 1.16
Controls
Operator age Respondent's age in years. 57.5 11.8
Risk tolerance How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks? 10-point scale: 1= don't like to take risks and 10= fully prepared to take risks (for analysis
purposes, this variable was scaled between zero and one by dividing by ten)
0.704 0.191
Cropland acres Owned and rented acres operated by the respondent in thousands. 1.42 1.52
Owned acres Percent of cropland acres owned by the respondent. 48.6 34.2
State average acres Average number of cropland acres operated by farmers in the respondent's state of operation in thousands of
acresa.
0.301 0.234
Rotating herbicides Over the past two years, on what percentage of your fields on your entire farming operation did you use each of
the following methods to control weeds? Rotating herbicide modes of action annually. 6-point scale: 1= did
not use, 2= less than 20%, 3= 20–39%, 4= 40–59%, 5= 60–79%, 6= 80–100%
4.29 1.71
a This secondary data is from the 2012 USDA NASS agricultural census.
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perceived need for cooperation. In addition, we include a measure of
the respondent's reported annual rotation of herbicide modes of action
(MOA). Regular MOA rotation is a BMP to reduce selection pressure for
HR weeds (Owen, 2016). However, there is a caveat, as farmers gen-
erally do not adopt integrated weed management practices until HR
weeds move within their farm boundary (Bonny, 2016; Livingston
et al., 2016; Llewellyn et al., 2004).
4. Methods
4.1. Survey and Data
From 2014 to 2016, an interdisciplinary research team implemented
a survey to gain a better understanding of weed management practices
among farmers across the United States. The sample included
Table 2
Probit regression results for concern about migration of herbicide-resistant weeds from nearby farming operations.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Marginal change in probability for a decrease/
increase in the explanatory variablea
Decrease Increase
Extension influence 0.112* 1.94 −0.033 0.031
Inadequate time −0.117** −2.14 −0.035 –
Multiple resistant weed concern 0.295*** 3.42 −0.094 0.074
Weed mobility perceived 0.552*** 7.35 −0.189 0.122
Techno-optimism −0.066 −1.03 0.018 −0.019
Other grower influence −0.056 −0.82 0.016 −0.016
Community ties 0.079 1.10 −0.023 0.022
Personal mobility 0.085 1.53 −0.025 0.023
Age −0.017*** −3.03 0.027 −0.029
Risk tolerance −0.075 −0.22 0.002 −0.002
Cropland acres −0.005 −0.12 0.000 0.000
Owned acres 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.000
State average acres −0.229 −0.88 0.002 −0.002
Rotating herbicides −0.010 −0.27 0.003 –
Constant −1.854*** −2.75 – –
Observations= 565; Maximized Log-likelihood=−277.01; Likelihood Ratio Test= 123.07⁎⁎⁎ with 14 degrees of freedom; Pseudo R2= 0.182; Significance levels:
⁎ =10%, ⁎⁎ =5%, and ⁎⁎⁎ =1%.
a All changes are evaluated at the mode of categorical variables and mean of continuous variables. Marginal probability changes for categorical variables are
evaluated for a one-unit change from the mode when feasible (e.g., the mode is not the maximum or minimum category). Marginal probability changes for
continuous variable are evaluated for a 10% change in the mean.
Table 3
Probit regression results for discussion of herbicide-resistant weeds issues with neighbors.
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Marginal change in probability for a
decrease/increase in the explanatory
variablea
Decrease Increase
Concern about HR weeds spreading from nearby operations 0.342** 2.49 −0.180 –
Extension influence 0.136*** 2.59 −0.048 0.045
Inadequate time −0.061 −1.20 −0.021 –
Multiple resistant weed concern 0.071 0.86 −0.025 0.024
Weed mobility perceived 0.038 0.51 −0.013 0.013
Techno-optimism 0.037 0.64 −0.013 0.013
Other grower influence 0.178*** 2.88 −0.064 0.058
Community ties 0.148** 2.26 −0.053 0.048
Personal mobility −0.048 −0.96 0.016 −0.017
Age −0.004 −0.75 0.007 −0.008
Risk tolerance 0.246 0.83 −0.008 0.008
Cropland acres 0.051 1.28 −0.002 0.002
Owned acres −0.002 −1.29 0.004 −0.004
State average acres −0.841*** −3.30 0.009 −0.009
Rotating herbicides 0.068** 1.99 −0.024 –
Constant −2.08*** −3.27 – –
Observations= 565; Maximized Log-likelihood=−342.21; Likelihood Ratio Test= 91.34⁎⁎⁎ with 15 degrees of freedom; Pseudo R2= 0.118; Significance levels:
⁎ =10%, ⁎⁎ =5%, and ⁎⁎⁎ =1%.
a All changes are evaluated at the mode of categorical variables and mean of continuous variables. Marginal probability changes for categorical variables are
evaluated for a one-unit change from the mode when feasible (e.g., the mode is not the maximum or minimum category). Marginal probability changes for
continuous variable are evaluated for a 10% change in the mean.
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approximately 9000 farmers from 28 states, comprising five major row
crop production regions (Dentzman, 2017). The full mixed-mode survey
conducted via electronic and regular mail is available from the authors.
The response rate was approximately 10%. We compared demographic
characteristics of respondents with Census and USDA information
bases. Statistical t-tests suggest that, within these regions, respondents
are skewed toward older, white individuals who operated slightly larger
farms. Even so, our survey includes more small-scale farms than pre-
vious grower surveys regarding weed management. Such surveys are
limited in scope, as they only include farms with at least 250 acres of
corn, soybeans, or cotton (Marra et al., 2004; Foresman and Glasgow,
2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Givens et al., 2011; Frisvold et al., 2009;
Hurley et al., 2009).
4.2. Modeling Analysis
We consider a recursive model to capture the relationships between
the three preconditions. Define the three dependent variables as:
=C1 1
If strongly agree or somewhat agree to"I
am concerned about HR weeds spreading
to my farming operation from nearby farming operations"
0 Otherwise
=C2 1
If discussed with the owner/manager of a field abutting or near one of
theirs about whether HR weeds are becoming a problem in their region
0 Otherwise
=C3 1
If strongly disagree or somewhat disagree to"Weed resitance can be managed
effectively without cooperation amongst farmers in a community"
0 Otherwise
Three equations specify the general recursive model structure to be
estimated:
= +C X1 1 1 (1)
= + +C X C2 2 21 1 2 (2)
= + + +C X C C3 3 31 1 32 2 3 (3)
where β 1, β 2, and β 3 are coefficients for the vector of explanatory and
control variables, X. γ21, γ31, and γ32 are coefficients for the dependent
variables in Eqs. (2) and (3). And, ε1, ε2, and ε3 are error terms. We
specify the common set of explanatory variables, X, for each regression
equation.
Given the system of equations, there is the possibility that the in-
troduction of outcome variables in regression Eqs. (2) and (3) will lead
to endogeneity bias (i.e. C1 may be correlated with ε2 in Eq. (2) and/or
C1 or C2 may be correlated with ε3 in Eq. (3)). To account for this issue,
we can estimate the fully observed recursive probit model developed in
Roodman (2011). When we perform this estimation, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Since Roodman's model assumes
normality, we repeat the exercise with the linear probability model and
seemingly unrelated regression. Again, we are unable to reject exo-
geneity.1 Since we do not find evidence of endogeneity, we report re-
sults from estimating independent probit models for each equation.2
5. Results
Table 1 presents descriptions and summary statistics of the depen-
dent and explanatory, both hypothesized and control, variables and
sample used in the analysis.3 Most farmers (71%) express concern about
HR weeds migrating from their neighbors' operations. The magnitude of
this percentage proves consistent with recent science documenting HR
weed migration (e.g., Beckie et al., 2015). Despite a clear majority
expressing concern about HR weed migration, only a slight majority
(56%) report discussing HR weeds with a neighbor who operated
nearby fields. Finally, a sizeable majority of respondents (61%) agree
that community-wide cooperation is necessary to effectively manage
HR weeds. In short, most respondents satisfy the three preconditions.
Table 4
Probit regression results for disagreement that herbicide-resistant weeds can be managed effectively without community cooperation.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Marginal change in probability for a decrease/increase in the explanatory variablea
Decrease Increase
Discuss HR weed problems with neighbors 0.072 0.59 0.023 –
Concern about HR weeds spreading from nearby operations 0.253* 1.84 −0.132 –
Extension influence 0.157*** 2.94 −0.047 0.041
Inadequate time −0.130*** −2.58 −0.038 –
Multiple resistant weed concern 0.214*** 2.61 −0.065 0.054
Weed mobility perceived 0.162** 2.21 −0.048 0.042
Techno-optimism −0.225*** −3.82 0.056 −0.068
Other grower influence 0.109* 1.75 −0.032 0.029
Community ties −0.034 −0.51 0.009 −0.010
Personal mobility −0.100** −2.01 0.027 −0.029
Age 0.005 0.99 −0.008 0.008
Risk tolerance 0.265 0.87 −0.007 0.007
Cropland acres 0.002 0.06 0.000 0.000
Owned acres 0.003 1.44 −0.004 0.004
State average acres 0.206 0.82 −0.002 0.002
Rotating herbicides −0.007 −0.20 0.002 –
Constant −1.78*** −2.80 – –
Observations= 565; Maximized Log-likelihood=−334.53; Likelihood Ratio Test= 86.31⁎⁎⁎ with 16 degrees of freedom; Pseudo R2= 0.114; Significance levels:
⁎ =10%, ⁎⁎ =5%, and ⁎⁎⁎ =1%.
a All changes are evaluated at the mode of categorical variables and mean of continuous variables. Marginal probability changes for categorical variables are
evaluated for a one-unit change from the mode when feasible (e.g., the mode is not the maximum or minimum category). Marginal probability changes for
continuous variable are evaluated for a 10% change in the mean.
1 The results of this analysis are detailed in the Supplementary online mate-
rial, Appendix B.
2 Independent linear probability models are also estimated to explore the
robustness of the results to the probit's normality assumption. These results are
reported in the Supplementary online material, Appendix C. These robustness
tests include estimates without the control variables in order to expand the
usable sample.
3 Descriptive statistics for the full survey sample are in the supplementary
online material, Appendix A.
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5.1. Multivariate Probit Analyses
Tables 2–4 present the results of the probit estimations of Eqs.
(1)–(3). As mentioned in the previous section, each model includes the
same hypothesized and control variables, while also accounting for the
recursive nature of the equations. Tables 3 and 4 indicate partial sup-
port for the recursive model structure. Concern about HR weed mi-
gration from neighbors is positively associated with discussion of HR
weeds in Eq. (2) and belief in the need for cooperative weed manage-
ment in Eq. (3). While the coefficient for discussion of HR weeds is
positively associated with the belief in the need of cooperation in Eq.
(3), it is not statistically significant.
5.1.1. Concern over HR Weeds Spreading from Nearby Farming Operations
The first regression yields several significant effects influencing
migration concern, each of which remains consistent with its hy-
pothesized sign (Table 2). Significant positive effects are estimated for
HR weed mobility, concern about MR weeds, and Extension influence.
Whereas, inadequate time for operators exerts a significant negative
effect. Operator age, a control variable, also shows a significant nega-
tive effect, albeit small.
5.1.2. Communication with Neighbors About HR Weeds
Table 3 presents the results for whether a farmer has discussed HR
weed issues with their neighbors. Previous research has consistently
found face-to-face communication to be an important precursor to
collection action of CPR problems (see Ostrom, 1998). Concern about
HR weeds migrating from nearby farming operations (C1), the recursive
model linkage, Extension influence, other grower influence, and com-
munity ties all exhibit significant positive effects as hypothesized. Of
the control variables, average state farm size has a significant negative
effect; whereas, the rotation of MOAs, a BMP, has a significant positive
effect.
5.1.3. Need for Cooperation
Eq. (3) examines the factors associated with respondents' views to-
ward the need for collective action to effectively manage HR weeds.
This precondition is theorized to be the product of concern about HR
weed migration from nearby farming operations (C1), communication
with neighbors about HR weed issues (C2), and other explanatory
variables. Table 4 indicates that multiple factors are significant, each
consistent with our hypotheses. As previously mentioned, (C1) has a
significant positive effect, supporting the recursive model. However,
(C2) is not significant, weakening a link in the recursive chain. Exten-
sion influence, MR weed concern, weed mobility concern, and other
grower influence all have significant positive effects.
Following CPR theory, farmers who find weeds to be especially
mobile are more likely to perceive collective action as a necessary
management approach. Both techno-optimism and personal mobility
have significant negative effects, with the magnitude of the effect larger
for techno-optimism. The strong effect of techno-optimism is on farmer
attitudes about weed management are consistent with other analyses
(Dentzman, 2018; Dentzman et al., 2016). Borrowing from economic
theory, we argue that, when there are more substitutes (or there are
believed to be more substitutes) for herbicides that are no longer ef-
fective, because of resistance, farmers will be less likely to engage in
collective action. And, in terms of personal mobility, operators who can
easily farm elsewhere may not see the benefit of engaging in collective
action in an area with a large HR weed infestation, as doing so would
increase transaction costs.
6. Conclusions and Implications
A growing body of agronomic and ecological research suggests that
some HR weed species can be quite mobile, making susceptibility to
herbicides a common property resource. As such, traditional education
and technical assistance (E&TA) programs aimed at influencing in-
dividual farmers may be less than fully effective. Our survey results
suggest most growers view susceptibility under a CPR framework: 87%
of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Even if I
keep my fields clean, I could get herbicide-resistant weeds from
neighboring farms.” This is consistent with other studies that find mi-
tigation is beyond the control of a single farmer, instead depending on
their neighbors' behaviors and other factors (Llewellyn and Allen, 2006;
Wilson et al., 2008).
A second major finding is concern about the migration of HR weeds
from nearby farming operations (C1) significantly influences the like-
lihood of farmers communicating with neighbors about HR weed issues
(C2) and their perceived need for collective action (C3). While this
lends support to the recursive model, C2 does not significantly influence
C3. That is, having such a discussion with neighbors does not perfectly
translate into positive views toward cooperation. Although C1 is esti-
mated to positively influence C2 and C3, the distribution of farmers
responses to these questions are very different. Our study finds that
71% of respondents express concern about HR weed migration.
However, only 56% discuss HR weed issues with their neighbors and
61% believe that cooperation is necessary for effective resistance
management. Focus group research has revealed the extreme reticence
some growers have about discussing weed management problems with
neighbors (Dentzman and Jussaume, 2017).
Why then is concern about weed mobility not perfectly translating
into communication with neighbors and perceived need for collective
action? Our results indicate that the set of significant variables are not
uniform across each stage of the recursive model. While the signs of
such variables are as hypothesized, only Extension influence sig-
nificantly affects all three stages. Two factors, MR weed concern and
perceived weed mobility, significantly influence the first and third
stages. This result suggests heterogeneity exists in the mechanisms
supporting collective action. As such, the development of HR weed
management should be approached with careful nuance. Diversity in
such conditions characterizes HR weed management as a wicked pro-
blem (Jussaume and Ervin, 2016).
We single out concern about MR weeds because of its key role in
CPR theory as a potential benefit of collective action. The latest evi-
dence indicates that the overall rate of newly confirmed herbicide-re-
sistant weed species to any herbicide mode of action has slowed since
2005 in the United States (Kniss, 2018). However, the number of MR
weed species/state pairs – which captures both the number and geo-
graphic spread of MR weeds – continues to increase at an increasing
rate (Heap, 2018). MR weeds are especially challenging to manage, and
our findings show that the concern of such weeds increases the concern
about HR weeds migrating from nearby farming operations and in-
creases the perceived need for cooperation.
Studies frequently cite farmer time constraints as a possible barrier
to the adoption of more proactive HR weed management practices
(Beckie, 2006; Hurley and Frisvold, 2016; Owen, 2016; Norsworthy
et al., 2012). Yet, with the notable exception of Riar et al. (2013), such
studies do not attempt to statistically examine the role of time con-
straints. Our results show strong statistical support for the hypothesis
that time constraints serve as a barrier to our preconditions, in parti-
cular, concern about HR weed migration and beliefs toward cooperative
management.
On a positive note, farmers who place greater importance on
Extension educators regarding weed management are more likely to
perceive a need for collective action. This finding is consistent with
Ervin and Frisvold (2016) and Stallman and James (2015). The ex-
perience of the Zero Tolerance Program to control HR Palmer amaranth
in Clay County, Arkansas is another example of the crucial role of Ex-
tension professionals in overcoming barriers to collective action (Barber
et al., 2016).
Finally, techno-optimism has a significant, negative effect on the
belief of the need for cooperative HR weed management. Dentzman
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(2018) suggests some farmers are already skeptical of the future of
herbicide chemistries, but express faith in them to cope with their own
perceived dependency on herbicidal weed control. No new commercial
herbicide MOAs have been commercialized in the past 30 years. In-
dustry has introduced new herbicide tolerant crops to more existing
MOAs. Yet, many weed species are already resistant to these herbicides
(Davis and Frisvold, 2017). As such, the agricultural chemical industry
is providing growers with mixed messages about the availability of new
herbicides that will solve current resistance problems. While some in-
dustry representatives assign a very low probability of new herbicide
chemistries in the foreseeable future (Stübler et al., 2016), others pre-
dict that in the future, “your odds of weed-resistance development
pretty much drop to zero,” and the herbicide resistance issue will be
eliminated by 2050 (Pates, 2016).
Using a similar measure of techno-optimism, Sun et al. (2017) find
that farmers with higher levels of techno-optimism are less likely to
engage in the rotation of herbicide MOAs and/or use multiple herbi-
cides. In a study of Australian farmers, Llewellyn et al. (2007) find those
who believe new herbicides would be available soon are less likely to
adopt weed resistance management practices, compared to farmers
more uncertain about the availability of new compounds. Conse-
quently, we argue one option to encourage the uptake of HR weed
management, both privately and collectively, is to more effectively
counter excessively optimistic messaging about the availability of new
compounds.
In closing, reversing the dramatic increase in herbicide resistance,
especially MR weeds, will require new strategies, departing from past E
&TA approaches targeting individual growers. A key component must
be community cooperation in the affected landscape, negating the
disincentives embedded in CPR situations. Stallman (2011) identifies
pest control as an ecosystem service (ES) well suited for collective
management at the landscape level. Landscape level management is
critical for the management of ecosystem services from agriculture
(Goldman et al., 2007; Swinton et al., 2007). Cumming et al. (2013)
argue that establishing resilient landscapes requires the creation of
relevant institutions acting at appropriate scales to modify and mod-
erate the demand for ecosystem services. Consistent with wicked pro-
blems (Shaw, 2016), the biophysical, economic, and social conditions
framing HR weed management vary across landscapes (Jussaume and
Ervin, 2016). Therefore, determining the appropriate scale and relevant
institutions will likely be an exercise in experimentation, learning, and
adaptive management. The significant factors of each precondition for
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